اتفاق أنديرا - عبد الله

من ويكيبيديا، الموسوعة الحرة
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اتفاق أنديرا غاندي - شيخ عبد الله هو اتفاق تم توقيعه في عام 1975 بين السياسي الكشميري شيخ محمد عبد الله ورئيسة وزراء الهند آنذاك أنديرا غاندي، سمح للأول بأن يصبح رئيس وزراء جامو وكشمير مرة أخرى بعد 22 عامًا.[1][2]

السياق التاريخي[عدل]

أدى التحول في توازن القوى في شبه القارة الهندية لصالح الهند في أعقاب النصر الهندي في الحرب الهندية الباكستانية 1971، مما انتهى بشيخ محمد عبد الله بالتنازل واتباع الشروط التي تمليها الهند.[3] حيث أدى الانتصار الهندي في بنغلاديش إلى زيادة مكانة أنديرا غاندي كرئيسة للوزراء في الهند، فقدم شيخ محمد عبد الله عرضًا بالاستفتاء، واستعادة العلاقة بين كشمير والهند إلى ما قبل 1953،[4] وفي عام 1975 تخلى شيخ عبد الله عن مطالبته بمنح شعب كشمير الحق في تقرير المصير.[5]

الاتفاق[عدل]

يُوصف الاتفاق بأنه بمثابة "استسلام" للهند، حيث يتضمن إعادة اندماج جامو وكشمير مع الهند، وأنها ستكون خاضعة لإدارة الحكومة الهندية بموجب المادة 370 من الدستور الهندي.[6][7] وأقر الاتفاق بحضوع ولاية جامو وكشمير لقوانين الدولة الهندية بشأن مسائل مثل الرفاه والقضايا الاجتماعية والثقافية وقانون الأحوال الشخصية للمسلمين.[8]

انظر أيضًا[عدل]

مراجع[عدل]

  1. ^ What's the mystery of the Indira-Abdullah accord?, Deccan Herald, 13 December 2012. نسخة محفوظة 10 أغسطس 2019 على موقع واي باك مشين.
  2. ^ Indira-Sheikh accord a milestone event: Vohra, Business Standard, 27 October 2013. نسخة محفوظة 10 أغسطس 2019 على موقع واي باك مشين.
  3. ^ Sumantra Bose (June 2009). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. صفحة 89. ISBN 978-0-674-02855-5. He probably also calculated that after Pakistan's defeat and dismemberment in the December 1971 Bangladesh war, the regional balance of power had swung decisively in India's favor, leaving him with little alternative to accepting terms dictated by New Delhi. 
  4. ^ N. Khan (25 June 2014). The Life of a Kashmiri Woman: Dialectic of Resistance and Accommodation. Springer. صفحات 103–. ISBN 978-1-137-46329-6. The consummate victory of the Indian military bolstered Indira Gandhi's position as premier of India, and she dealt with the demand for plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir with a heavy hand. She declared that the Sheikh's insistence on restoring the pre-1953 constitutional relationship between the state and the Indian Union, which would afford greater autonomy and freedoms to the state, was inconceivable because, 'the clock could not be put back in this manner'. 
  5. ^ Sumantra Bose (June 2009). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. صفحة 88. ISBN 978-0-674-02855-5. In 1975 Sheikh Abdullah finally abandoned his self-determination platform. This was not a settlement Abdullah would have accepted or even considered -twenty, ten or even five years earlier. His politics and popularity since 1953 had been based on defiance of New Delhi's authoritarianism. 
  6. ^ Sumantra Bose (June 2009). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. صفحة 88. ISBN 978-0-674-02855-5. TIn return for Abdullah's release and appointment as IJK's chief minister, his ever-faithful associate, Mirza Afzal Beg, signed another 'Delhi accord' with the government of India whose terms verged on capitulation to New Delhi and Indira Gandhi. The agreement reaffirmed, virtually without modification, the terms of IJK's incorporation into India since 1953. A patently hypocritical clause stated that 'Jammu and Kashmir, a constituent unit of the Union of India, shall continue to be governed under Article 370." In reality, between 1954 and the mid-1970s, 28 constitutional orders "integrating" IJK with India had been issued from Delhi, and 262 Union laws had been made applicable in IJK. 
  7. ^ Victoria Schofield (30 May 2010). Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 978-0-85773-078-7. Although Kashmir's special status, enshrined in article 370 of the Indian Constitution was retained, the state was termed ' a constituent unit of the Union of India. The Indian government was able 'to make laws relating to the prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian national flag, the Indian national anthem and the Constitution.' This effectively gave India control in the areas which mattered most. There was to be no return to the pre-1953 status. 
  8. ^ Sumantra Bose (June 2009). Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard University Press. صفحة 88. ISBN 978-0-674-02855-5. The Delhi accord gave IJK's government the right to 'review' only those laws from the shared center-state 'concurrent list' of powers which had been extended to IJK after 1953, and to 'decide' which of them might 'need amendment or repeal'...This aside, the Delhi accord patronizingly confirmed IJK's right to legislate on 'welfare measures, cultural matters, social security, and [Muslim] personal law.'